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Abstract
What are the origins of individual savings behavior? Using data on identical and fraternal twins matched
with data on their savings behavior, we nd that an individual's savings propensity is governed by both
genetic predispositions, social transmission from parents to their children, and gene-environment interplay
where certain environments moderate genetic inuences. Genetic variation explains about 35 percent of
the variation in savings rates across individuals, and this genetic eect is stronger in less constraining, high
socioeconomic status environments. Parent-child transmission inuences savings for young individuals and
those who grew up in a family environment with less competition for parental resources. Individual-specic
life experiences is a very important explanation for behavior in the savings domain, and strongest in urban
communities. In a world progressing rapidly towards individual retirement savings autonomy, understanding
the origins of individuals' savings behavior are of key importance to economists as well as policy makers.
We are thankful for comments from seminar participants at the China Europe International Business School,
Financial Research Association, and Singapore International Conference on Finance, and valuable discussions with
Peter Bossaerts, Darrell Due, Daniel Hamermesh, David Hirshleifer, Greg Hess, Andrew Karolyi, Camelia Kuhnen,
Andy Lo, Ed Rice, Jay Ritter, Frank Yu, and Paul Zak. We thank Jack Goldberg at the University of Washington
Twin Registry for advice, Florian Muenkel for research assistance, and Kara Ralston for editorial assistance. We
acknowledge research funding from the Financial Economics Institute and the Lowe Institute of Political Economy at
Claremont McKenna College, and the Global Business Center and the CFO Forum at the University of Washington.
This project was pursued in part when Cronqvist was visiting the Institute for Financial Research (SIFR), which he
thanks for its hospitality. Statistics Sweden and the Swedish Twin Registry (STR) provided the data for this study.
STR is supported by grants from the Swedish Research Council, the Ministry of Higher Education, AstraZeneca, and
the National Institute of Health (grants AG08724, DK066134, and CA085739). The project has been reviewed and
approved by the Swedish Twin Registry, the Ethics Review Board for the Stockholm region, and Statistics Sweden.
Any errors or omissions are our own.
yCronqvist: McMahon Family Chair in Corporate Finance, George R. Roberts Fellow, and Associate Professor of Fi-
nancial Economics, Claremont McKenna College, Robert Day School of Economics and Finance (hcronqvist@cmc.edu);
Siegel: Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Washington, Michael G. Foster School of Business (ss1110@uw.edu).I Introduction
There is enormous variation across individuals in terms of wealth accumulated at retirement age, even
among those with relatively similar lifetime incomes. Researchers have found that this variation can
not easily be explained by \chance" events (e.g., inheritances, health status) or by asset allocation
choices (e.g. Venti and Wise (1998, 2000) and Bernheim et al. (2000)). Instead, savings behavior,
i.e., the choice to save or spend earlier in life, seems to be a much more important determinant
of variation in wealth accumulation.1 These ndings raise a very fundamental question: Where
does an individual's savings behavior originate from? What makes one individual a \spender" while
another individual, with very similar income and other socioeconomic characteristics, saves a large
portion of his or her income?
One can, of course, take dierent empirical approaches to addressing these questions, and we
are not rst to estimate determinants of individuals' savings behavior.2 The empirical approach of
our work, which has not been previously explored in the literature, is to decompose the variation
in savings behavior across individuals into genetic versus environmental inuences (e.g., social
transmission of behavior from parents to their children), and to examine gene-environment interplay.
This approach will result in better understanding of where individuals' savings behavior originate
from. Our analysis relates to an area of research at the intersection of economics and biology.
Several prominent economists have long recognized a great potential for research in this area (e.g.,
Marshall (1920), Becker (1976) and Hirshleifer (1977)),3 but it is with the recent appearance of
large data sets of individuals matched with their economic behaviors that empirical research in this
area has also become possible.
In a standard economic model, dierences in savings behavior across individuals are related
to dierences in preferences. Several economic theorists have recently proposed that the existence
and general shape of such preferences are the outcome of natural selection (e.g., Rogers (1994),
Robson (2001), Netzer (2009), and Brennan and Lo (2009)), implying that preferences, and thus
1Friedman (1953) concludes that \a large part of the existing inequality of wealth can be regarded as produced by
men to satisfy their preferences" (p. 290).
2We refer to Browning and Lusardi (1996) for an extensive review of micro-level research on savings behavior.
3Marshall (1920) went as far as arguing that \economics is a branch of biology broadly interpreted" (p. 772)
1savings behavior, are at least partially genetically determined. There is conrming evidence that
preferences with respect to both risk and time are in part genetic (e.g., see Kuhnen and Chiao
(2009), Barnea et al. (2010), and Cesarini et al. (2009b) for risk preferences, and Eisenberg et al.
(2007) and Carpenter et al. (2009) for time preferences). Other economists have emphasized that
behaviors and preferences may be socially (as opposed to genetically) transmitted from parents to
their children (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2008), and Dohmen
et al. (2008)). Casual evidence indeed seems to suggest that some parents give their children a piggy
bank, open a savings account, and instill the importance of being frugal, while other parents do not.
Such parent-child socialization imply that children adopt their parents' consumption-savings choices
by learning. Such socialization has been found to be empirically important for other economic
behaviors than savings (e.g., Bisin and Verdier (2000), Bisin et al. (2004), and Fernandez et al.
(2004)). Finally, Knudsen et al. (2006) argue that genes and environmental factors interact in
important ways. Our empirical approach allows us to quantify the proportion of the total variation
across individuals in the propensity to save that is attributable to genes versus parent-child social
transmission, accounting for gene-environment interactions.
There are several reasons why it is important for economists to uncover the origins of individuals'
choices about savings. First, most industrialized countries are in the process of rapidly moving away
from pensions, or dened benet retirement plans, meaning that individuals become increasingly
responsible for their own savings. As we progress towards more autonomy in the domain of savings
it becomes increasingly important and relevant to explain why some individuals choose to save
while others do not.4 Second, work in this area potentially has important public policy implications,
in particular for economists' evaluations of the sensitivity of savings behavior to policy initiatives.
Bernheim (2009) recently concluded: \The discovery of a patience gene could shed light on the
extent to which correlations between the wealth of parents and their children reect predispositions
rather than environmental factors that are presumably more amenable to policy intervention" (p.
14).
Our research is related to work by Charles and Hurst (2003) and Knowles and Postlewaite (2004)
4There already exists a large literature that attempts to understand the eects of nancial literacy on savings
behavior (e.g., Lusardi (1998), Bernheim et al. (2001), and Bernheim and Garrett (2003)).
2that document signicant parent-child similarities in savings behavior. Charles and Hurst (2003)
show that the age-adjusted elasticity of child wealth with respect to parental wealth is 0.37 (before
bequests). While similarity in income explains about half of the intergenerational wealth elasticity,
they speculate that similar savings propensities among parents and their children is another possible
factor. Knowles and Postlewaite (2004) show that parents who save more than predicted by their
income and other socioeconomic characteristics, on average, have children that behave similarly.
Both these studies are important in that they document that parents pass on savings propensities
to their children, but they do not examine whether the origins of savings behavior are genetic versus
social, an important distinction from the perspective of modeling behavior and the sensitivity of
savings behavior to policy initiatives.5
In contrast to previous research on consumption-savings choices, we decompose the variation in
the individual propensity to save into genetic and environmental components. We do this by applying
empirical methods developed by quantitative behavioral genetics researchers, in combination with
data on the savings behavior of pairs of identical and fraternal twins.6 Our data on twins are
from the Swedish Twin Registry, the world's largest research database of twins. These data are
matched by Statistics Sweden with income and net worth data from these individuals' tax lings.
Using changes in net worth and disposable income, we determine an individual's savings rate. The
decomposition of that rate into genetic and environmental factors builds on an intuitive insight:
Identical twins share 100 percent of their genes while the average proportion of shared genes is only
50 percent for fraternal twins, so if identical twins have signicantly more similar savings behavior
than fraternal twins, then there is evidence that the propensity to save, at least partly, originates
from an individual's genetic composition.
We nd that innate genetic propensities explain about 35 percent of the variation in savings
5A large literature in economics has studied parent-child similarities in other domains than savings behavior.
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002) report that socioeconomic status is much more persistent across generations than previously
thought. Borjas (1992) and Solon (1992) nd a positive and signicant intergenerational correlation in income. Chiteji
and Staord (1999) examine asset allocations, and nd that children (as young adults) are more likely to own stocks
when their parents owned such nancial assets. Mulligan (1999), Black et al. (2005), and G uell et al. (2007) provide
evidence of signicant intergenerational transmission with respect to education.
6Several studies in economics have examined data on twins, e.g., Behrman and Taubman (1976), Taubman (1976),
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), and Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998). Others have used adoption data to address related
questions, see for example Sacerdote (2002) and Bj orklund et al. (2006).
3propensities across individuals. Men's savings behavior is explained more by their genes compared to
women, whose behavior is more inuenced by individual-specic life experiences. These results are
robust to using several alternative savings rate measures and model specications. We conclude that
each individual is endowed with a genetic code which aects his or her savings behavior through life,
an eect which does not decay with the gain of own life experience. We also nd that parents transmit
savings behavior to their children outside of a genetic mechanism, in particular for the youngest
individuals in our sample and for those who grew up in a family environment with less competition
for parental resources (measured by the presence of non-twin siblings in the family). Finally, we
nd evidence of important gene-environment interplay, involving an individual's current as well as
childhood and early adolescence environments as moderators of genetic predispositions. Generally
we nd that genetic variation plays a more prominent role in less constraining environments, as for
example characterized by education or wealth. That is, social transmission and other environmental
factors aect variation in savings behavior, both directly and through gene-environment interactions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related research. Section III describes
our data sources, denes the savings measures and other variables, and reports summary statistics.
Section IV reports our initial results on genetic and social transmission of savings behavior as well
as robustness checks. Section V reports results related to gene-environment interactions. Section VI
discusses what the evidence does and does not mean. Section VII concludes.
II Related Research
Since the seminal work by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), the lifecycle savings model has been the
framework through which economists have generally studied individuals' saving and consumption
choices: individuals save to smooth consumption over time. Individuals who seem to be more
patient have indeed been found to save more (e.g., Lusardi (2001)). The standard model has been
extended to account for, e.g., precautionary savings and bequest, suggesting that dierences in
consumption-savings choices across individuals are related to: (i) dierences in preferences with
respect to risk, time, and bequest, and (ii) dierences in circumstances such as income volatility or
4borrowing constraints.7 Of course, circumstances are partly endogenously determined as a function
of the same underlying preference parameters.
Empirical evidence documents substantial variation in savings behavior across individuals. Some
of that variation appears to be related to dierences in circumstances,8 while Lusardi (1998, 2001)
nds that dierences in risk, time, and bequest preferences also seem to matter as predicted.
Finally, research on individuals' risk preferences has found signicant cross-sectional variation,
persistence, and behavioral consistency across domains (e.g., Barsky et al. (1997) and Donkers et al.
(2001)).9 There is also evidence of signicant variation in time preferences across individuals (e.g.,
Warner and Pleeter (2001) and Harrison et al. (2002)).
We now discuss the extent to which we expect this variation in preferences, and thus in savings
behavior, to be caused by genetic dierences versus dierences in parent-child social transmission
(i.e., learning from parents).10
A Genetics and Savings Behavior
If savings behavior is found to be heritable, we would in standard economic models expect the
genetic transmission to operate through individuals' preferences. Do we have reason to expect that
risk and time preferences are, at least partly, innate? An increasing number of economic theorists
would suggest that the answer is yes. For example, Rogers (1994), Robson (1996), Netzer (2009),
Robson and Samuelson (2009), and Brennan and Lo (2009) all propose that the existence and
general shape of preferences are the outcome of natural selection. For this to be the case, preferences
must be at least partially genetically determined. Of course, evolution often results in no variation
across individuals at all. For example, all humans are genetically coded to have two eyes (absent
7For precautionary savings models, see, e.g., Leland (1968), Kimball (1990), Skinner (1988), Deaton (1991), Carroll
(1992) and Hubbard et al. (1995). For models that incorporate bequest motives, see Becker and Tomes (1976) and
Bernheim et al. (1985).
8See for example Hubbard et al. (1994), Lusardi (1998), and Carroll and Samwick (1997, 1998).
9Kimball et al. (2009) report signicant cross-sectional variation in survey measures of risk preferences, controlling
for measurement error. Sahm (2007) reports that persistent dierences across individuals account for a vast majority
of the cross-sectional variation in risk aversion, i.e., risk preferences are very persistent. Barsky et al. (1997) report
evidence of consistency in risky behaviors across domains: those who are less risk averse are found to smoke more,
drink more, have no insurance, choose riskier employment, and hold more stocks compared to other individuals.
10While we are not aware of direct evidence of genetic variation with respect to bequest motives, Rushton et al.
(1986) document that altruism is up to 50 percent heritable and Rodgers et al. (2001) nd that variation with respect
to the number of children an individual has a signicant genetic component.
5genetic defects). So, to the extent that variation in savings behavior is genetic, it must be that
such variation is optimal in the population (\frequency dependent selection") or irrelevant from an
evolutionary perspective. That is, variation in risk aversion or time preferences across individuals
either improves the survival rate of the species or does not correlate with the survival of the species
at all.11
A.1 Risk Preferences
Emerging evidence in economics and nance suggests that an individual's risk aversion has a
signicant genetic component. Recent studies use data on twins to estimate the genetic component
of risk preferences using individual-level data from the nancial domain (e.g., Barnea et al. (2010)
and Cesarini et al. (2009b)). For example, Barnea et al. examine individuals' overall nancial
portfolios and nd that about one third of the cross-sectional variation in the share in equities across
individuals is explained by an innate genetic factor. In a standard frictionless model, dierences in
risk preferences cause cross-sectional variation in the share in equities. The Barnea et al. (2010)
evidence may therefore be interpreted as reecting genetic variation in risk preferences across
individuals. Experimental research on genes and risk aversion conrms these ndings (e.g. Cesarini
et al. (2009a) and Zyphur et al. (2009)).
Another important string of recent research at the intersection of economics and genetics has
examined which specic genes are responsible for risky behaviors. This work starts with the
well-established result that, for some individuals, taking more risk results in more and longer-lasting
production of \feel-good" neurotransmitters, e.g., dopamine.12 Moreover, gene-mapping studies
have found which specic genes regulate this dopamine production. Those with genes such as the
7-repeat allele (7R+) of the dopamine receptor D4 (CRD4) have been found to nd risky behaviors
more rewarding.13 In the nancial domain, Kuhnen and Chiao (2009) and Dreber et al. (2009) elicit
risk preferences using experiments and nd that those with certain genes have a larger propensity
11For broad reviews of research at the intersection of neuroscience, genetics, and economics, see, e.g., Camerer et al.
(2005) and Benjamin et al. (2008).
12See Caplin and Dean (2008) for work on the axioms behind the \dopaminergic reward prediction error" hypothesis.
13For experimental research on dopamine receptor genes and risk preferences, see Carpenter et al. (2009) and Dreber
et al. (2010).
6to take risk than those who do not have those genes.14 These studies reveal which specic genes are
related to risk preferences, but they cannot inform us about the relative importance of genes versus
social transmission of behavior or the proportion of the variation in behavior attributable to these
mechanisms.15
A.2 Time Preferences
In his seminal \marshmallow experiment", psychology researcher Walter Mischel found signicant
variation across pre-school children in their propensity to forego an immediate reward (i.e., consuming
a marshmallow) for a larger, but delayed, reward (i.e., consuming two marshmallows when the
experimenter returned to the room). Most importantly, subsequent research on these very same
children has shown that the time preferences estimated at an early age using marshmallows explain
a series of important economic outcomes in life, including SAT scores and educational attainment,
social competence, and even drug abuse (e.g., Mischel et al. (1989)). That is, those who are more
patient, and do not immediately consume the marshmallow, also have better ability to invest in,
e.g., education.
The evidence raises question of whether individual time preferences are genetic. Recent gene-
mapping studies indeed suggest that individuals' discount rates have a genetic component. For
example, Eisenberg et al. (2007) use the \delay discounting method" to elicit individuals' time
preferences. This method poses a series of choices between smaller intermediate and larger delayed
monetary rewards (e.g., Fuchs (1982)) and with dierent durations of a delay, for example \Would
you prefer to have $500 today or $1,000 in ve years?" Most importantly, they nd that the DRD2
TaqI A and DRD4 VNTR genes cause signicant variation in individual discounting.
14Zhong et al. (2009) show that individuals with the Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) gene prefer lotteries with a
small probability of a very substantial payo.
15Contrary to early beliefs among many geneticists, gene-mapping has had a dicult time pinpointing down the
exact genes responsible for common diseases such as cancer and Alzheimer's. For a recent popular press account of
the challenges of gene-mapping, see, e.g., Wade (2010).
7B Parent-Child Social Transmission of Savings Behavior
Social transmission is another potentially important mechanism behind parent-child similarities in
savings behavior. The specic social transmission mechanism we study in this paper is \direct vertical
socialization," i.e., transmission of behavior from parents to their children (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985), and Richerson and Boyd (2005)).16
Bisin and Verdier (2001) provide an economic model of vertical parent-child socialization. A
common assumption in such models is that children are born without dened preferences, and they
are rst exposed to their parents' socialization. Parents have a technology, \parenting," which
transmits their own preferences to their children. If parent-child socialization is not successful, the
child is in these models aected by a random role model (representing peers, teachers, etc.) in the
population. Altruism makes parents exert costly eort to socialize their children, but this altruism is
paternalistic in the sense that parents prefer to socialize their children to their very own preferences.
Models with these assumptions have been used to explain parent-child social transmission of, for
example, ethnic, religious, and labor supply preferences (e.g., Bisin and Verdier (2000), Bisin et al.
(2004), and Fernandez et al. (2004)). These models of social transmission of behavior from parents
to their children may extend to risk and time preference parameters, though there is not much
evidence of transmission at such a detailed level (e.g., Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2008)).
The questions whether parent-child social transmission inuences behavior, i.e., whether parenting
matters, has been researched for decades, but there is no agreement on an answer. Economists
have only recently started to research related questions, and the extent to which parents inuence
outcomes of importance to economists is still an open question. In a controversial article, Harris
(1995) challenges the notion that parents signicantly aect the behavior of their children. She
concludes based on evidence from behavioral genetics that parents have little long-lasting eects on
their children's personality. By contrast, Knudsen et al. (2006) provide evidence that exposure, in
particular in early life, to certain risk factors, such as poverty and limited parent education, impact
children's adult life. Maccoby (2000) attempts to reconcile these views and suggests that the same
parental inuence might have dierent eects on children whose genetic make-up is dierent. She
16In this paper, we do not study \oblique socialization," i.e., socialization outside the family, which takes place in
society at large though imitation and learning from others in the population.
8also points to the potential importance of gene-environment interactions, where genetic expression
depends, for example, on the quality of the parenting.
Based on the reviewed research, we predict that savings behavior is partly governed by an
individual's genes and parent-child socialization, and potentially also by gene-environment interplay
such that certain environments moderate genetic inuences.
III Data
A Data Sources
We use a unique data set with a large number of twins. The data set was constructed by matching
cross-sectional information from the Swedish Twin Registry (STR) with annual nancial as well as
demographic data from individuals' tax lings.
For tax purposes, Sweden, like many other countries, collects detailed information on an
individual's income. Until 2006, Swedish taxpayers were also subject to a 1.5 percent wealth tax. By
law, nancial institutions were therefore required to report to the government detailed information
about assets owned by individual tax payers. The combination of data on income, asset ownership,
and outstanding debt provides an unusually detailed and complete characterization of nancial
decisions of Swedish households.17
Based on an individual identier, personnummer, Statistics Sweden matched the income and
wealth data for all twins that are on le with the STR. The STR is the world's largest twin registry
and provides high quality data for researchers Lichtenstein et al. (2006). While all twins in Sweden
are registered at birth, the STR has collected extensive additional data through interviews and
surveys in which between 60 and 70 percent of the twins have participated.18 Most important for
our study is the zygosity of a twin pair: monozygotic, or identical, twins are genetically identical,
17Calvet et al. (2007, 2009) use these data to study portfolio choices of Swedish investors.
18The STR data used in this study was obtained through the \SALT" (Screening Across Lifespan Twin) study
for twins born between 1886 and 1958 and through the \STAGE" (Swedish Twin Studies of Adults: Genes and
Environment) study for those born between 1959 and 1985.
9while dizygotic, or fraternal, twins are genetically dierent.19
B Measuring Savings Behavior
While our data set contains detailed information on the twins' income as well as asset ownership,
we do not have a pre-dened measure of their savings behavior. Moreover, as Dynan et al. (2004)
point out, there are several possible ways of measuring individuals' savings rates. Conceptually, we
characterize an individual's savings behavior by the proportion of disposable income in a period that
is not consumed, but instead invested (or saved) for future consumption or bequest. For comparison
purposes, this amount is scaled by the disposable income and then referred to as the Savings Rate.
In principle, the amount saved during a period can be measured by the change in an individual's
net worth during that period. Under such a broad savings measure, unrealized expected and
unexpected capital gains or losses, for example in the form of changes in an individual's house value,
are included in the amount saved, as long as such capital gains are not converted into consumption
through increased leverage. For this measure, all capital gains and losses would be included in the
disposable income. Alternatively, savings could be dened much more narrowly by excluding any
capital gains and by focusing on the disposable income that is actively set aside and not consumed
in a given period.
In this study, we propose a denition of saving that starts with the change in an individual's net
worth between the end of 2002 and the end of 2006, but eliminates { in the case of homeowners {
unrealized capital gains or losses related to the individual's home. Thus, the Savings Rate (si) for
individual i is dened as:
si =




Net worth is dened as the sum of the value of all nancial assets, including bank accounts,20 the
19Zygosity is based on questions about intrapair similarities in childhood. One of the survey questions is: Were you
and your twin partner during childhood \as alike as two peas in a pod" or were you \no more alike than siblings
in general" with regard to appearance? This method has been validated with DNA as having 98 percent or higher
accuracy. For twin pairs for which DNA sampling has been conducted, zygosity status based on DNA analysis is used.
20Cash in bank accounts with a balance of less than SEK 10,000 (or for which the interest was less than SEK 100
during the year). However, Statistics Sweden's estimations suggest that 98 percent of all cash in bank accounts is
included in the data.
10value of all real estate assets, and the value of other assets less outstanding debt. Disposable income
is calculated as the sum of labor income, investment income, income from a private business, early
retirement income, as well as transfer payments such as child support and unemployment benets
less income taxes and alimony payments. Since the amount saved is calculated over a four year
period, disposable income used in the calculation of the savings rate represents the total disposable
income for years 2003 through 2006.
Unrealized capital gains or losses are not included in the disposable income, but realized capital
gains or losses are taxable and therefore generally reported as investment income. Because we
generally do not know at which price individuals have purchased their home, we cannot calculate
the capital gain that at the time of the sale is included in the disposable income. We therefore drop
all homeowners that have moved over the four-year period or those whose homeowner status has
changed over the four-year period.21
C Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
While Statistics Sweden is able to identify over 50,000 individual twins with tax records in 2006, we
impose several criteria which reduce the number of observations in our nal data set. Specically,
we require that net worth is non-missing in 2002 and 2006 and that the four-year average net worth
(calculated as the average of net worth at the end of 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006) is positive. We
drop all twins whose four-year average disposable income (again calculated as the average of the
disposable income in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006) is below SEK 10,000 (approximately $1,400 at an
average exchange rate of SEK 7.20 per dollar).22 To avoid changes in net worth unrelated to savings
decisions made by the individual, we exclude twins whose civil status has changed, and similarly,
homeowners who have moved between the end of 2002 and the end of 2006. We also restrict our
sample to twins that are at least 18 years old, but at or below age 65 at the end of 2006.23 We do
so to focus on twins that are likely to have a signicant income from which to save as well as the
motive to save for retirement. Finally, we drop individuals in the bottom and top one percent of
21We identify movers by observing changes in their four-digit municipality code.
22We require at least three non-missing observations for the calculation of any four-year average.
23The ocial retirement age in Sweden is 65, but we observe age only at the end of the year and hence include
twins that turned 65 at some point in 2006.
11the distribution of the savings rate to avoid that our results are aected by outliers. As we discuss
below in more detail, our estimation approach requires complete pairs of identical and fraternal
twins. Our nal data set of 17,630 observations therefore only contains complete twin pairs.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the number of twins included in our data set by zygosity and gender.
Out of 17,630 twins, 5,142 (29%) are identical, while 12,488 (71%) are fraternal twins. That is,
fraternal twins are more common than identical twins. Moreover, we see that opposite-sex twins
are the most common twin type (39%), and identical male twins are the least common one (12%)
in our data set. The evidence in the table on the relative frequency of dierent types of twins is
consistent with that from other studies which use large samples of twins.
Panel B reports summary statistics for several individual characteristics.24 Detailed denitions
for all variables are provided in Appendix Table A1. Unless stated otherwise, all variables refer
to 2006. Comparing identical and fraternal twins, we see that they are quite similar. The average
age of identical twins is about 49 years, while the average age of fraternal twins is 53 years. The
civil status is also similar across twin types: over 50% are married, about 10% are divorced and
only about 1% are widowed. 15 to 20% of the twins in our sample have a high school degree, while
about half have a college or equivalent degree. About a third of the twins in our data set have an
advanced graduate or equivalent degree. The majority of tiwns, more than 70%, are homeowners in
2002 and 2006. The average annual disposable income, averaged over 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006,
and expressed in U.S. dollars, is $33,000 to $34,000, with similar dispersion among identical and
fraternal twins. The average net worth is slightly lower for identical twins (about $113,000) than for
fraternal twins (about $119,000), while the dispersion is the same for both groups. Conditional on
home ownership, the average value of owner-occupied houses in 2006 is approximately $155,000.
Panel C reports details on the savings behavior of the twins in our data set. Between the end of
2002 and the end of 2006, net worth changed on average by about $62,000 for identical and $66,000
for fraternal twins. Part of that increase in net worth is due to increases in real estate values. Using
home values for the 12,903 twins that are homeowners, we observe an increase in median home
prices by approximately 33% between 2002 and 2006. Averaging across all twins, homeowners and
24The size of the samples (N) diers across rows because of data availability.
12non-homeowners, we see that about $40,000 of the change in net worth is related to change in
home prices. Adjusting the change in net worth by this change in the home value and scaling this
dierence by the disposable income over the four years yields our savings rate. For identical twins
the average saving rate is 15%, while it is 19% for fraternal twins. The median saving rates are
lower for both groups, and about 10%. Finally, the dispersion across identical twins (48%) and
across fraternal twins (50%) is very similar.
Dynan et al. (2004) study a similar savings rate measure for the U.S. using micro data from
the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between
1984 and 1989. They document median saving rates between 3 and 10%. Since their estimates are
not corrected for the change in home values (about 6% p.a. during their time period), our ndings
suggest that the Swedish individuals in our sample save a larger proportion of their disposable
income than Americans did in the 1980s.
IV Empirical Results
A Parent-Child Similarities in Savings Behavior
Before we perform an empirical decomposition of an individual's propensity to save into genetic and
environmental components, we estimate the relation between a child's (twin's) savings behavior and
that of his or her parents. Specically, we estimate the following two regression model specications:
sk =  + 1sp + 1kagek + 2kage2
k + 1pagep + 2page2
p + eki (2)
sk =  + 1sp + 2sp(agep   agek) + 1kagek + 2kage2
k + 1pagep + 2page2
p + eki; (3)
where sk and sp are the savings rates of the child, k, and the parents, p, respectively, agek, age2
k,
agep, and age2
p measure their age and age-squared in 2006. eki is an error term that is possibly
correlated between twins within a twin pair i. Parent-child similarity in savings behavior means
that 1 is predicted to be positive.
Of the 17,630 twins in our data set, only 1,510 twins have at least one parent who is alive in
2006 and is still below the legal retirement age. We drop all child-parent combinations for which
13both parents are older than 65 years because the incentives to save for retirement are likely absent
for those parents. We would, of course, have preferred to compare the savings behavior of parents
and their children at the very same point in their respective life cycles, for example, comparing the
savings behavior of a 31-year old twin to the savings behavior of his or her parents when the parents
were 31 years of age. This is not possible because we have a relatively short time-series. However,
in the model in equation (3) above, we explicitly control for and examine the importance of the
dierence between the age of the child and the average age of the parents. The savings rate for the
parents is dened as that for the twins, i.e., as the four-year change in net worth relative to the
four-year disposable income, adjusted for changes in home prices. When both parents are alive, the
savings rate is calculated at the household-level.
Panel A of Table 2 provides summary statistics for the sample of 1,510 twins and their parents
used in this analysis. The average twin in this subset is 31 years old, while the average age of
the parents' is 60, implying an average age dierential of about 29 years. This age dierential is
probably an important contributor to the signicant dierences in disposable income as well as net
worth between parents' and their children. The average savings rate is about 2% for the children
compared to 25% for the parents.
In Panel B, we report regression results for parent-child similarity in savings behavior. Model I
in the table suggests that, controlling for age and gender of the children as well as the age of the
parents, children whose parents save a larger proportion of their income will also save relatively
more. This eect is signicant at the 5% level.25 A one standard deviation dierence in the savings
rate of parents translates into a four percentage points dierence in the savings rate between the
children. Model II suggest that the parent-child similarity decreases substantially as the parent-child
age dierential increases. The regression model estimates imply that at the same point in life, i.e.,
setting the age dierential to zero, a one standard deviation dierence in the parents' savings rate
corresponds to a 32 percentage point dierence in the savings rate of the children.
These results show that there is a signicant similarity between parents and their children in
terms of their propensities to save. That is, the children of \spenders" are not savers, at least not
25Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity as well as correlation within twin pairs.
14on average. However, these results do not reveal the extent to which the cause of this similarity is
genetic versus the result of vertical social transmission of behavior from parents to their children.
In the rest of the paper, we will address this question in order to understand the origins of savings
behavior.
B Correlations for Identical versus Fraternal Twin Pairs
A starting point to understand whether savings behavior is genetic is simply to examine the
correlations in behavior separately for identical and fraternal twins. If identical twins, who are
genetically more closely related than fraternal twins, have more similar propensities to save, then
this is evidence that the propensity to save is partly heritable, i.e., part of the variation in savings
behavior is due to genetic variation across individuals. We therefore compute and compare Pearson's
correlation coecients for savings propensities separately for pairs of identical and fraternal twins.
Figure 1 shows the correlation results, and they are striking. We nd that the savings behavior is
much more correlated among identical twins than it is among fraternal twins, suggesting a signicant
genetic component for the propensity to save. More specically, the correlation among pairs of
identical twins is 0.37, compared to only 0.18 for fraternal twins. This dierence is statistically
signicant at the 1% level. We also report separate correlations for male and female twins, and
nd that the dierence in correlations (0.24 versus 0.13) among identical and fraternal twins is
signicantly larger among male than among female twins, suggesting that genes explain a larger
proportion of the cross-sectional variation in savings behavior among men than among women.
The correlation results provide a rst and intuitive indication that variation in savings behavior
has a genetic component as the correlation of savings rates among identical twins is about double
the correlation among fraternal twins. It is important to emphasize, however, that because the
correlation in savings behavior among identical twins is signicantly below one, the results in the
table suggest that genes do not completely explain savings behavior, but that other factors are also
important. In the rest of the paper, we therefore perform a more formal empirical decomposition
of the cross-sectional variation in savings behavior into genetic versus parent-child socialization
components, and we also examine the extent to which gene-environment interplay explains savings
15behavior.
C An Empirical Decomposition of the Propensity to Save
C.1 Methodology
To empirically decompose the propensity to save, we specify and estimate the following random
eects model:26
sij =  + Xij + aij + ci + eij; (4)
where j (1 or 2) indexes one of the twins in a pair i.  is an intercept term and  measures the
eects of the included covariates (Xij). aij and ci are unobservable random eects, representing an
additive genetic eect and the eect of the environment common to both twins (e.g., parenting),
respectively. eij is an individual-specic error term that represents idiosyncratic environmental
eects (\life experiences") as well as measurement error.
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a separately from 2
c is feasible because of the
covariance structure implied by genetic theory. Consider two unrelated twin pairs i = 1;2 with twins
j = 1;2 in each pair, where the rst pair is identical twins and the second pair is fraternal twins. The
corresponding genetic components are: a = (a11;a21;a12;a22)0. Analogously, the vectors of common
and idiosyncratic environmental eects are: c = (c11;c21;c12;c22)0 and e = (e11;e21;e12;e22)0.
Assuming a linear relationship between genetic and behavioral similarity, genetic theory suggests
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26This model is often referred to as an \ACE model" in quantitative behavioral genetics research, and has been used
extensively. A stands for additive genetic eects, C for common environment, and E for idiosyncratic environment.
16We use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to estimate the model (e.g., McArdle and Prescott
(2005) and Feng et al. (2009)).
There are several important assumptions behind this model. Equal environments: Researchers
often assume that identical and fraternal twins raised in the same family experience equally similar
environments. However, parents, teachers, peers and others may treat identical twins more similarly
than fraternal twins. Gene-environment interaction: Recent research in behavioral genetics suggests
that interactions between genes and the environment, rather than genes and the environment
separately, inuence behavior. Genetic mechanisms: It is often assumed that genetic eects are
additive. However, behavior may be inherited through dierent genetic mechanisms. For behavior
determined by a dominant mechanisms, a dominant gene inherited from one parent overrides a
recessive gene inherited from the other parent. Random mating: Researchers assume that individuals
are as likely to choose mating partners who are dierent from themselves as they are to choose
partners who are similar for a particular behavior. If, however, individuals tend to choose mates
like themselves, then fraternal twins share more than 50 percent of their genes, and thus more
similarities on genetic behavior, because they receive similar genes from their fathers and mothers.
We return to and address these assumptions later in the paper.27
C.2 Estimates from the Random Eects Model
Table 3 reports estimates of variance components A, C, and E. A is heritability, i.e., the proportion









The proportions attributable to common and idiosyncratic environmental eects, C and E, are
computed analogously.
Panel A reports results using data on all twins. We include Male, Age, and Age-squared as
covariates in Xij when estimating the model in equation (4). As a benchmark for model t, the
rst row of the panel reports an \E model" in which both A and C are constrained to be zero, and
27For a more extensive discussion of the assumptions of the model, see for example Plomin et al. (2008).
17the second row reports a \CE model," in which only A is constrained to zero. The nal row in
the panel reports a full \ACE model." We also report the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to
compare t across models and likelihood ratio (LR) statistics and p-values for comparing the \E
model" against the \CE model," and the \CE model" against the \ACE model."
We draw several conclusions from the analysis in the table. First, based on AIC, the full ACE
model is strongly preferred; based on the LR, the full ACE model is preferred over a CE model,
which in turn is preferred at the 1%-level over an E model. That is, empirically modeling a genetic
factor signicantly improves the t of a model which explains cross-sectional variation in individual
savings behavior. Second, we quantify the proportion of the total residual variation in savings
behavior attributable to a genetic eect A and nd that it is 36 percent (statistically signicant
at the 1%-level). That is, variation in savings behavior originates to a large extent from genetic
variation across individuals. This result is in contrast to our evidence regarding C, which is estimated
to zero, suggesting that savings behavior on average is not explained to any signicant extent by
dierences in the common parental environment in which children grow up. Finally, we nd that
the idiosyncratic environment E contributes substantially to the variation in savings behavior. E is
64 percent, and is statistically signicant at all levels. This is the largest component in the model,
but captures an entire set of possible individual-specic life experiences, shocks, other non-genetic
circumstances as well as measurement error. It suggests that life events inuences an individual's
savings behavior, such that experiences of certain shocks signicantly change an individual's savings
behavior.
In Panel B of the table, we reestimate the model in equation (4) for same sex twins only. In the
analysis in the previous panel we did control for gender through an indicator variable as a covariate
in Xij, but dropping opposite sex twins is an alternative approach, and one that is sometimes used
in behavioral genetics research. Excluding these individuals from our analysis does not signicantly
change any of our conclusions. The A (E) component is still about 36 (64) percent.
Panel C reports results on gender-based genetic dierences in savings behavior, i.e., we ask to
which extent genes inuence savings dierently for men and women. To answer this question, we
estimate separate models based on gender. We nd that for men, the A component is 42 percent,
18i.e., larger than for women, for which it is only 29 percent. That is, the relative genetic variation of
men's propensity to save is about 44 percent larger than that of women. The C component is zero
for men, but 2.4 percent for women, albeit not statistically signicant. Thus, there is some evidence
that while the savings behavior of men is more attributable to their genes, the behavior of women in
the savings domain is aected relatively more by individual-specic life experiences. The behavior
of an individual's spouse can, for example, be one such life event which impacts behavior and is
captured by E in our model. A spouse eect is expected to be strongest for women from older age
cohorts, for which the spouse on average potentially inuence savings behavior the most. There is
evidence supporting such predictions because the E component is very similar for younger men and
women, while it is 60 percent for older men compared to 77 percent for older women (untabulated).
What are the possible interpretations of our results? One interpretation of the signicant genetic
component is that preferences for risk, time, and/or bequest are genetic, and that they in turn aect
savings behavior. It has already been documented by others that individuals who are more risk
averse also tend to save more (e.g., Lusardi (1998)), and risk aversion seems to have a signicant
genetic component (e.g., Kuhnen and Chiao (2009), Barnea et al. (2010), and Cesarini et al. (2009b)).
To the extent that savings behavior reects precautionary savings motives, our evidence can be
interpreted as genetic risk aversion aecting individuals' savings propensities.
Another possible interpretation is that genetic time preferences are responsible for a genetic
component of savings behavior. In a standard economic model of savings behavior, individuals
who are more patient save more. Some researchers have recently made references to a \patience
gene" (Bernheim, 2009) such that those equipped with such genes would then be predicted to save
more. There is also emerging experimental evidence that individuals' discounting of the future has
a genetic component (Eisenberg et al., 2007). Our evidence can thus be interpreted as individuals'
time preferences and patience having a genetic component which aects savings behavior among
individuals.
19C.3 Parent-Child Social Transmission Eects for Subsets of Individuals
One striking result so far is that parenting and the common family environment seem to aect
savings behavior very little, if at all. This is surprising given that social transmission of savings
behavior from parents to their children seems to be such a natural mechanism behind signicant
parent-child similarities in behavior (e.g., Bisin and Verdier (2000); Bisin et al. (2004), Fernandez
et al. (2004), and Knudsen et al. (2006)). While the parenting eect on savings behavior is zero on
average, we examine in Table 4 the possibility that a signicant eect emerges for specic subsets of
individuals.
We rst examine dierent subsets of individuals based on their age. More specically, in Panel A
of the table we estimate and report the variance components A, C, and E for separate age groups:
the youngest (Age  35), the oldest (50 < Age  65), as well as those of ages in-between. We nd
that the total parental eect on children's savings behavior, through genes as well as socialization,
i.e., A + C in the table, is the largest (46 percent) for the youngest in our sample, compared to
only 30 percent for the oldest. That is, parental eects on individuals' savings behavior are most
signicant earlier in life, subsequently decaying. The explanation for this decay is the disappearance
of the eect of social transmission from parents to their children, while the genetic eect does
not change signicantly. In particular, we nd that a signicant C component emerges for the
youngest individuals in our sample. The common environment explains about 17 percent of the
cross-sectional variation in the propensity to save among the youngest. This result contrasts with
the C components for any of the other age groups, which are found to be zero.28
Our interpretation of this evidence is that parent-child social transmission does indeed aect
children's savings behavior, but early on in life, and unlike genetic eects it does not seem to have life
long impact on individuals' savings behavior. These results are consistent with work in behavioral
genetics which has documented a signicant eect of the common family environment in early ages
on, e.g., personality, but also found that such eects approach zero in adulthood (e.g., Bouchard
28We nd that genes still explain as much as 30 percent of the cross-sectional variation in saving propensities among
those older than 50 years of age. The persistence of behaviors with strong genetic origins is consistent with existing
evidence; see, e.g., the work by McClearn et al. (1997) on a genetic component of cognitive ability among twins age 80
or older (it has long been established that cognitive ability is genetic, but the new nding of this study is that the
genetic eect is so persistent).
20(1998)). While our analysis in the previous section did not show any signicant average eect of
the common family environment on savings behavior, our analysis by age groups reveals that the
parental environment seems to be relatively more important in explaining the savings behavior
of the youngest individuals. One possibility, which is open to future research, is that peer eect,
relative to parent eects, become more important for savings behavior as individuals grow older.
We have also examined family characteristics related to the structure and the size of the family.29
More specically, we predict that when parents have only a xed supply of resources (e.g., time)
for socialization during which children may learn behaviors from their parents, then the presence
of non-twin siblings competing for such scarce parental resources may reduce the average eect
of parenting. That is, competition and constraints within the family may signicantly reduce
parent-child inuence through socialization, and thus aect savings behavior.
Panel B of Table 4 reports separate model estimates for twins who grew up in families with
no non-twin siblings compared to those who grew up with non-twin siblings. The common family
environment explains 15 percent of the cross-sectional variation in savings propensities among
individuals with no siblings. The eect is statistically signicant at the 1%-level. Conversely, we
nd no signicant eect of parenting when there are non-twin siblings in the family in which the
twins grew up. That is, the presence of siblings seems to reduce the parent-child social transmission
eect on savings behavior.
The conclusion is that the particular structure or size of the family in which an individual grew
up can signicantly inuence savings behavior at a much later point in life. In particular, our results
suggest that within-family constraints and competition for scarce parental resources can signicantly
inuence the propensity to save in adulthood. By showing for which specic subsets of individuals
a parent-child social transmission eect emerges, these results provide further understanding of the
origins of individuals' savings behavior.
29See Becker (1991) for important work on the family in economic research.
21C.4 Robustness
Table 5 presents several robustness checks with respect to our measure of savings behavior as well
as the equal environment assumption.
Preferences for Risk, Time, and Bequest. In a standard life cycle model, the savings behavior
of an individual will depend on age and in particular preferences with respect to risk, time, and
bequest. In Panel A, we control for a measure of revealed risk preferences, the relative equity share
in an individual's nancial portfolio.30 We also include the number of children as a measure of
bequest motive. We nd that the A, C, and E components are essentially unchanged when we
control for risk aversion and bequest. This result implies that dierences in risk aversion or bequest
across individuals do not completely explain our nding of a genetic factor inuencing savings
behavior, and is consistent with heritable time preferences.
Measuring Savings Behavior. The savings rate we have introduced above eliminates the unrealized
change in home value from the total change in net worth. Alternatively, and closely related to the
savings rate proposed by Dynan et al. (2004), we can add the change in home value to the disposable
income by which we scale the total change in net worth (Savings Rate 2). We also examine a
denition of the savings rate (Savings Rate 3) that simply relates the total unadjusted change in net
worth to the unadjusted disposable income. Panel B reports results for both alternative measures of
savings behavior.31 Our results do not seem sensitive to how we measure savings behavior.
Equal Environments. If identical twins are treated more similarly than fraternal twins, then our
model may attribute such unequal environments to the genetic component A. One approach to
this problem is to study twins separated soon after birth who were thus \reared apart." C is by
construction zero for these twins as they did not share a common parental environment. However,
it is uncommon for adoption authorities to separate twins and with the additional lters we use
when constructing our data set, we end up with a sample that is too small for reliable statistical
analysis (2 identical and 40 fraternal twin pairs). However, most research on reared apart twins
30To not confound risk preferences with factors aecting stock market participation, we only include stock market
participants. Accordingly the sample size drop to 12,616 twins.
31Note that in the construction of Savings Rate 2 and Savings Rate 3, we have again dropped the top and bottom
one percentile of the respective distributions. Therefore the number of observations is slightly smaller than the previous
sample of 17,630.
22conrms results from data sets that include twins who grew up in the same family; see, e.g., the
seminal work by Bouchard et al. (1990) and more recent work in nancial economics by Barnea et al.
(2010). Unfortunately, our data set contains too few twins that were reared apart. As an alternative
robustness check we study twins who do not interact or who interact little with each other as adults,
measured through survey questions by the STR (\How often do you have contact?"). Panel C of
Table 5 estimates and reports the variance components A, C, and E for separate contact intensity
groups. We nd a signicant genetic component of savings behavior even among those who have no
or little contact, reducing concerns that genetic and common environmental eects were confounded
in our previous analysis.32
Genetic Mechanisms. Our analysis so far has assumed an additive genetic eect. For some
behaviors, geneticists have found evidence of a dominant genetic eect. A dominant genetic eect
can be added to the model in equation (4); see, e.g., Plomin et al. (2008) for details. Our estimate
of a dominant genetic component D is 8 percent, albeit not statistically signicant at conventional
levels, and the total genetic component (A + D) from this model is 37 percent (untabulated). That
is, our conclusions of a signicant genetic eect on the propensity to save does not change when
empirically modeling a dominant gene eect.
Random Mating. Our empirical approach assumes that individuals mate randomly, at least
relative to the particular behavior examined in the study. There is some research in sociology which
suggests that positive assortative mating by culture is more important than assortative mating
by economic behavior (Kalmijn, 1994), but we are not aware of work on mating specically based
on savings propensities.33 It is important to emphasize, however, that positive assortative mating
would downward bias our reported estimates of the A component, as it would create more similarity
between fraternal twins.
32We also nd that a signicant C component (22 percent) emerges among those who interact a lot. Those with
lots of contact create their own common environment as they communicate after separating from their parents. This
result is consistent with social interaction aecting individuals' behavior through for example word-of-mouth (e.g.,
Bikhchandani et al. (1992, 1998)), and emphasizes the importance of social transmission of behavior from others than
parent.
33Economists and sociologists have examined assortative mating based on education (e.g., Pencavel (1998) and
Mare (1991)) and the extent to which which individuals marry to diversify their labor income risk versus marry for
love (Hess, 2004).
23V Gene-Environment Interactions
Neurobiologists have demonstrated that the expression of genes can change in response to certain
experiences or exposure to particular environments (Rutter (2006)). Such gene-environment (GxE)
interaction can also change the relative importance of genetic factors as genes are moderated by
environmental factors. While an individual's genes might provide an innate predisposition to a
certain behavior, specic environmental conditions determine the extent to which this potential
will indeed be realized. As reviewed above, there is some recently emerging work on the genetic
origins of economic behaviors, but so far there is little work on gene-environment interactions. In
this section, we discuss existing research related to gene-environment interplay. We then empirically
analyze such interaction eects with respect to savings behavior.34
Two theoretical models of GxE interactions oer competing predictions for GxE interaction
eects. First, the bioecological model, proposed by Bronfenbrenner and Ceci (1994), suggests that
genetic inuences on behavior are most evident when the environment is supportive, because of a
predicted greater actualization of genetic predispositions in supportive compared to less supportive
environments.35 This model can, for example, explain the evidence in Taylor et al. (2010), who
examine the GxE interaction between genetic ability to read and teacher quality, and show that
the genetic eect on reading uency among rst- and second-graders increases as the quality of
the children's teacher increases (measured by reading gain among non-twin classmates). Second,
the diathesis-stress model suggests that heritability of a behavior should be greater in poorer
environments, where stressors may lead to the expression of genes that would not be actualized in
more supportive environments. This model has, for example, recently been proposed to explain
why some behavioral disorders have a greater relation with specic genes in environments where
individuals have been exposed to a large number of stressful life events (e.g., Caspi et al. (2002) and
Caspi et al. (2003)).
34In a recent paper on the development of abilities in young individuals, Cunha and Heckman (2010) summarize the
arguments well by arguing that \Additive \nature" and \nurture" models, while standard and still used in many
studies of heritability and family inuence, mischaracterize how ability is manifested. Abilities are produced, and gene
expression is governed, by environmental conditions." (p.3)
35Economists may use a dierent terminology to describe \supportive environments," such as environments with
more individual opportunities or choice, or less constraining environments.
24Conceptually, we can distinguish between moderating environments that are obligatorily shared
by both twins and such that are twin-specic. As Purcell (2002) points out, the former if unmodeled
will induce an upward bias of A, the latter type of gene-environment interaction on the other
hand will bias E upwards. We start our analysis of gene-environment interactions with the
parental environment both twins experienced. We then examine the importance of the twin-specic
environments.36
A Early Environment
We examine the extent to which potentially important characteristics of the parental and family
environment in childhood and early adolescence interact with genetic eects. One characteristic
of an individual's early environment is the socioeconomic status (SES) of the family in which the
individual grew up. Parental education is our measure of family SES (and related environmental
factors), and we are able to separate between those whose parents have no college education and
those with parents with at least college education.37
Panel A of Table 6 reports that the genetic inuence on an individual's savings behavior is
stronger among those who grew up in high-SES families. We nd that genes explain 39 percent
of the cross-sectional variation in savings propensity among individuals who grew up in high-SES
families. For those who grew up in low-SES families, the corresponding A component is only 32
percent. That is, early environmental factors in an individual's life seem to result in dierent genetic
expression of savings behavior much later in life.
We conclude that the socioeconomic status of an individual's family in childhood or early
adolescence is a moderator for genetic inuences on savings behavior much later in life, and thus
governs the extent to which an innate predisposition to a behavior will indeed be actualized.
36In addition to gene-environment interactions, twins (or their parents) might have selected into certain environments,
reecting gene-environment correlations. Correlation between genes and the shared environment will bias C upwards,
while correlation between genes and the individual-specic environment will bias A upwards. The eects of gene-
environment correlations are hence the opposite of the eects of gene-environment interactions. See Purcell (2002) for
details. The current analysis abstracts from gene-environment correlations.
37Parents' education is admittedly an imperfect measure of SES, but we are not able to measure, e.g., parents'
wealth during the period their children grew up. While imperfect, parental education is a measure that has been used
by other researchers, and we do not believe that possible measurement error in this measure causes any systematic
biases in our empirical analysis.
25This evidence is supportive of the bioecological model of GxE interactions. A less constraining
environment, at least in the sense of higher socioeconomic status of the family in which an individual
grew up, is related to a stronger genetic expression in the domain of savings behavior. Of course,
this result opens for a series of currently unanswered research questions about the exact nature
of the genetic and environmental inuences on savings behavior that are related to a family's
socioeconomic status.
B Later Environment
We also examine whether an individual's current environment (as opposed to the environment the
individual grew up in) interacts with genetic eects. There are several environmental factors which
we predict to be potentially important for the genetic expression of savings behavior. We report
these results related to an interplay with \later environments" in Panels B and C of Table 6.
We rst examine the importance of an individual's own wealth. Wealthier individuals are, on
average, less constrained and thus more likely to behave as predicted by their innate predisposition.
For example, a poor individual in our sample may be constrained from saving, regardless of how risk
averse or patient the individual is. In contrast, a wealthy individual has the choice of whether to save
or to spend. Panel B of the table reports that genes explain about 18 percent of the cross-sectional
variation of the propensity to save among the poorest individuals, meaning those in the lowest
quintile of the wealth distribution. This may be compared to 39 percent, i.e., more than double,
among the wealthiest individuals, i.e. those in the highest quintile of the wealth distribution. That
is, the genetic eect on savings behavior is much stronger among the wealthy compared to the
relatively poor. In other words, the savings behavior of the poorest individuals originate more
from individual-specic life experiences. This evidence is consistent with wealthy individuals being
less constrained resulting in greater actualization of genetic predispositions of savings behavior.
This evidence shows that genetic eects can de facto be censored when an individual is subject to
constraining environments.
An alternative is to examine an individual's current socioeconomic status rather than wealth,
though wealth is of course a measure of SES. Using education as a measure of SES, we nd that the
26genetic eect if larger for high-SES individuals compared to low-SES individuals, consistent with
the wealth result. The A component is 23 percent for low-SES individuals compared to 35 percent
for high-SES individuals (untabulated). This result also shows that the current socioeconomic
environment is a stronger moderator (by more than 50 percent) of genetic eects on savings
behavior compared to the parental and family environment in childhood and early adolescence. Most
importantly, a less constraining individual socioeconomic environment with more opportunities,
both early and later in life, amplies the genetic expression of savings behavior.
Another potentially important environmental factor is the community/region where an individual
lives. One such environmental characteristics is rural versus urban areas, because of the potential
for signicant dierences in, e.g., social interaction with peers and consumption choices. Using data
from Statistics Sweden, we classify regions into very rural (the rst quintile of the corresponding
density distribution), very urban (the top quintile of the distribution), and intermediate. The average
number of individuals per square kilometer in very rural areas such as Lapland is 12, compared
to 2,162 for very urban areas such as the city of Stockholm. Panel C reports that the genetic
component, A, is 56 percent in sparsely-populated rural areas, i.e., almost double the eect in more
densely populated areas, where it is only 32 percent. That is, an individual's genetic predisposition
is found to be expressed signicantly more strongly among individuals in rural communities. One
interpretation of this evidence is that urban life may result in exposure to more idiosyncratic
life experiences, through social interaction with peers who also live there or through some other
mechanisms, which may aect the importance of the genetic eect on savings behavior. That is, in
urban environments, an individual's savings propensity may be governed more by the environment
such as peers and social networks.
The conclusion from the evidence reported in this section is the importance of gene-environment
interplay in explaining the origins of savings behavior. That is, an individual's innate predisposition
is actualized to a greater or lesser extent depending on the environment which the individual
experiences, and we found that both the earlier and later environments in life act as moderators of
genetic eects. Of course, these results opens for a series of currently unanswered research questions
about the exact nature of the genetic and environmental inuences on savings behavior, and what
27other environmental factors are potentially important moderators for genetic inuence on savings
behavior.
VI What the Evidence Does and Does Not Mean
In this section, we discuss several important implications of our ndings.
Implications for Accumulation of Wealth
The ndings in this paper, taken together with the existing evidence on genetic determinants of
income and asset allocation (Behrman and Taubman (1989), Taubman (1976), and Barnea et al.
(2010)), suggest that cross-sectional variation in wealth, in particular at retirement age, should
to some extent reect genetic dierences across individuals. In Table 7, we estimate model (4)
for the wealth of all individuals that are around retirement age (60 to 69), that is we study the
outcome of many years of savings and investment behavior.38 We nd that about 38 percent of
the cross-sectional variation in wealth accumulated up to retirement is explained by genetic factors.
The eect of the common family environment, which by model construction reects wealth inherited
from parents, explain seven percent of the cross-sectional variation.39 The remaining 55 percent is
due to individual-specic life experiences.
Behavioral Factors
So far in the paper we have taken the perspective that an individual's savings behavior is mainly
determined by preferences, i.e., we have considered a standard economic model of savings behav-
ior. However, our evidence does not mean that these are the only candidate explanations. Some
economists have argued that non-standard models and \behavioral factors" are also important
explanations for variation in savings (or the lack of savings) across individuals; see, e.g., Bernheim
38Dierently from our main sample, we include all individuals that in 2006 were between 60 and 69 years old and
had non-missing wealth data between 2003 and 2006. To avoid that our results are aected by outliers, we drop
individuals in the bottom and top one percent of the distribution.
39While this eect is consistent with parent-child social transmission of behavior on average playing only a limited
role for savings and asset allocation choices, it is lower than some estimates for the U.S. (e.g., Davies and Shorrocks
(2000)). This dierence is likely due to our subset of older individuals.
28et al. (2000) and Madrian and Shea (2001). It is, for example, possible that biases such as lack of
self-control results in insucient savings among some individuals (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin (1981)).40
It would be very interesting to study the extent to which retirement savings biases are innate. The
evidence that lack of self-control, at least extreme versions such as attention-decit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), has a genetic component (Barkley, 1997) certainly suggests that biases aecting
an individual's savings behavior may be partially genetic.
Variation Across Time and Countries
While we nd that genes explain about 35 percent of the variation in savings behavior across
individuals in our sample, it is important to emphasize that this is not a universal biological
constant, but an estimate relative to the amount of environmental variation in the sample. If there
is limited variation in environmental factors, then the genetic component will indeed be relatively
large. Our data are from Sweden, a country which is often perceived to have relatively high cultural
homogeneity (meaning low variation in environmental factors in the context of our model). Since
we only observe individuals from one country at one point in time, our empirical analysis cannot
capture the relative importance of country characteristics such as culture, i.e., we can not measure
whether changes in a country's \savings culture" at large aect individual behavior. Finally, the
focus on one country rather than a broader set, likely reduces the amount of total variation in
environmental factors.
Oblique Socialization and Peer Eects
Our evidence should not be interpreted as meaning that peer and social networking eects are not
important for savings behavior.41 First, while one specic social transmission mechanism { the one
between parents and their children { is found to be small, our research also reveals some of the
specic subsets of individuals for which parent-child transmission of behavior are signicant. Second,
in this paper we have not analyzed peers eects and their eects on individuals' savings behavior.
40See Benartzi and Thaler (2007) for a review of biases in retirement savings behavior.
41Several studies in economics and nance suggest that peer eects are important in the nancial domain (e.g.,
Madrian and Shea (2000), Hong et al. (2004), and Brown et al. (2008)).
29However, one result in our paper which indeed suggests that social interaction is important is our
twin-twin communication evidence: Twins who interact more with each other have more similar
savings behavior. This result is consistent with social interaction aecting individuals' behavior
in the nancial domain (e.g., Bikhchandani et al. (1992, 1998), Shiller (1995), and Hirshleifer
and Teoh (2009)) and emphasizes the potential importance of \oblique socialization" (Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981). To the extent that twins have non-overlapping social networks, peer
eect on savings will in our paper be captured by the individual idiosyncratic factor (E in our model).
Eectiveness of Public Policy
Economists and policy makers have recently devoted signicant eort to examining nancial literacy
and methods to change individual savings behavior (e.g., Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Lusardi
and Mitchell (2009), and Bayer et al. (2009)). Our evidence does not mean that public policy
and nancial literacy education in the domain of savings behavior can never be eective. It is
correct, as argued by Bernheim (2009), that evidence of a genetic component of savings behavior has
implications for economists' evaluations of the sensitivity of savings behavior to policy initiatives:
Environmental factors are presumably more amenable to policy than innate predispositions. But
some public policy can aect the average amount of savings without aecting the variation across
individuals. For example, policy that changes a country's \savings culture" are not captured in our
model. Moreover, educational experiences may be individual-specic and would be reected in the
idiosyncratic environmental component, which explains well over 50 percent of the cross-sectional
variation in savings behavior in all our analysis. We also nd evidence of signicant gene-environment
interplay, which opens the question of whether policy initiatives interact with genetic factors, so
that some individuals are more susceptible to policy than are others. In this sense, understanding
the genetic component of savings behavior and its interactions with the environment may produce
more eective policies.
30VII Conclusion
The goal of this study has been to examine the origins of individuals' savings behavior. That is, what
makes an individual a \spender" while another individual, with similar observable characteristics,
saves a large proportion of his or her income? Our work suggests that there is not a simple answer
to this fundamental economics question. By contrast, an individual's savings behavior is governed
by both innate genetic predispositions, social transmission of behavior from parents to their children,
and gene-environment interplay where the environment moderate genetic inuences. Genes explain
on average about 35 percent of the variation in savings rates across individuals, but the genetic
expression of savings behavior is stronger in environments characterized by higher socioeconomic
status (own or parental). We nd no evidence that parenting matter on average for savings behavior,
but a signicant eect of parent-child socialization does emerge when studying young individuals,
and those who grew up in environments characterized by less competition for parental resources.
Individual-specic experiences turn out to be a very important explanation for behavior in the
savings domain, and most intensely so in urban communities, opening the question of what specic
life events are most important for an individual's propensity to save. We also discussed what the
reported evidence may mean for public policy aiming at changing individual savings behavior.
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39Table 1
Summary Statistics









Number of twins (N) 17,630 2,244 2,898 5,142 2,466 3,178 6,844 12,488
Fraction (%) 100% 13% 16% 29% 14% 18% 39% 71%
Panel B: Socio-demographic Characteristics
All Twins
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Age 17,630 48.96 52.00 12.36 53.23 55.00 9.70
Married 17,630 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.57 1.00 0.49
Divorced 17,630 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.12 0.00 0.32
Widowed 17,630 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.14
High School Degree 17,454 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.20 0.00 0.40
College Degree 17,454 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.48 0.00 0.50
Graduate Degree 17,454 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.32 0.00 0.47
Homeowner 17,630 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.74 1.00 0.44
Disposable Income (USD - 4-year average) 17,630 33,197 29,522 19,434 34,227 30,273 20,658
Net Worth (USD - 4-year average) 17,630 112,948 69,905 127,368 118,931 77,846 127,290
Home Value (USD - in 2006) 12,903 158,869 127,572 117,683 154,099 120,309 122,497
Panel C: Savings Behavior
All Twins
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Change in Net Worth (USD) 17,630 61,810 41,118 87,334 65,725 43,589 93,197
Change in Home Value (USD) 17,630 41,277 25,334 67,421 40,435 25,406 70,022
Savings Rate 17,630 0.15 0.08 0.48 0.19 0.10 0.50
Identical Twins Fraternal Twins
Identical Twins Fraternal Twins
Identical Twins Fraternal Twins
Table 1 Panel A provides information on the number of identical and non-identical twins used in this study. Panel B provides summary 
statistics for several socio-demographic characteristics, separately for identical and non-identical twins. Panel C reports summary statistics 
for the main measure of savings behavior, which is defined as the four year change in net worth adjusted for the change in home value 
(zero for non-home owners) divided by the four year disposable income. All variables are defined in Appendix Table A1. 
 Table 2
Parent-Child Similarities
Panel A: Summary Staistics - 1,510 Children (Twins) and their Parents
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Age 30.78 30.00 6.58 59.38 60.00 5.14
Age Difference (between parents and children) 28.60 28.00 4.96
Disposable Income (USD - 4-year average) 24,235 23,960 11,097 71,198 61,271 46,459
Net Worth (USD - 4-year average) 46,269 24,559 61,334 283,438 209,100 255,367
Saving Rate 0.02 0.03 0.46 0.25 0.15 0.44
Panel B: Intergenerational Similarities
II I
Savings Rate - Parents 0.1001 0.7233
0.0432 0.3582
Savings Rate - Parents x Age Difference -0.0220
0.0135
Age - Child (Twin) -0.1115 -0.1247
0.0245 0.0236
Age-squared - Child (Twin) 0.0016 0.0018
0.0004 0.0004
Age - Parents -0.0330 -0.0176
0.0522 0.0504
Age-squared - Parents 0.0004 0.0003
0.0005 0.0004








Table 2 Panel A reports summary statistics for 1,510 twins and their parents if at least one parent is still alive in 2006 and at 
least one parent is at most 65 years old at the end of 2006. Age is the age of the twin or the average age of the parents. Age 
Difference is the difference between the age of the twin and the average age of the parents. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix Table A1. Panel B reports coefficient estimates and standard errors from a linear regression model of the Savings 
Rate of the twin. The explanatory variables are the parents’ Savings Rate, the parents’ Saving Rate interacted with Age 
Difference (column II), Age and Age-squared of the twin and the parents as well as a Male Indicator. N denotes the number of 
observations.  Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within twin pair correlation. See Appendix Table A1 for a 
detailed definition of all variables. 
 Table 3
Decomposition of Savings Behavior
Panel A: All Twins
(N=17,630)






Panel B: Same Sex Twins
Model N AIC
ACE 10,786 -54,940
Panel C: By Gender
Model N AIC
Male Twins 4,710 -10,404

























Table 3 reports results from maximum likelihood estimation of linear random effects models. The Savings 
Rate is modeled as a linear function of Male, Age, Age-squared as well as up to three random effects 
representing additive genetic effects (A), shared environmental effects (C), as well as an individual-
specific error (E). In Panel A, we report results for a model that only allows for an individual-specific 
random effect (E model), a model that also allows for a shared environmental effect (CE model), and a 
model that also allows for an additive genetic effect (ACE model). The model is estimated using all 17,630 
twins in our data set. When the non-negativity constraint for a variance parameter is binding, we report a 
zero. In each case, we report Akaike's information criterion (AIC), the variance fraction of the combined 
error term explained by each random effect (A – for the additive genetic effects, C – for shared 
environmental effects, E – for the individual-specific random effect) as well as the corresponding standard 
errors. We perform likelihood ratio tests (LR) and at the 1% level reject the E model in favor of the CE 
model and the CE model in favor of the ACE model. We do not report the coefficient estimates for Male, 
Age, and Age-squared. Panel B reports results for an ACE model estimated on only same sex twins. 
Panel C reports results for ACE models estimated separately for male and female twins. N provides the 
number of observations used in each estimation.  Table 4
Social Transmission Effects for Subsets of Twins
Panel A: Differences across Age Groups
Model N
Age ≤ 35 1,636
35 < Age ≤ 50 4,542
50 < Age ≤ 65 11,452



















Table 4 reports results from maximum likelihood estimation of linear random effects models. The 
Savings Rate is modeled as a linear function of Male, Age, Age-squared as well as up to three 
random effects representing additive genetic effects (A), shared environmental effects (C), as well as 
an individual-specific error (E). In Panel A, we report results for the subset of young, middle-aged, 
and old twins. Panel B reports results separately for those twins that have no other siblings and those 
that have at least one non-twin sibling. In each case, we report the variance fraction of the combined 
error term explained by each random effect (A – for the additive genetic effects, C – for shared 
environmental effects, E – for the individual-specific random effect) as well as the corresponding 
standard errors. When the non-negativity constraint for a variance parameter is binding, we report a 
zero.  We do not report the coefficient estimates for Male, Age, and Age-squared. N provides the 
number of observations used in each estimation.  Table 5
Robustness
Panel A: Controlling for Risk Aversion and Bequest
Model N
Not Controlling for Risk Aversion 
and Bequest 12,616
Controlling for Risk Aversion and 
Bequest 12,616
Panel B: Alternative Savings Measures
Model N
Savings Rate 2 17,465
Savings Rate 3 17,516
Panel C: Contact Intensity
Model N
Little contact  3,258
Intermediate contact 9,696





























Table 5 reports results from maximum likelihood estimation of linear random effects models. The Savings 
Rate is modeled as a linear function of Male, Age, Age-squared as well as up to three random effects 
representing additive genetic effects (A), shared environmental effects (C), as well as an individual-specific 
error (E). In Panel A, we report results for the subset of 12,616 twins that hold stocks in their financial 
portfolios. We first report an ACE model with only Male, Age, Age-squared as explanatory variables. We then 
report estimates for an ACE model after also controlling for the relative fraction of the financial portfolio 
invested in stocks, a proxy for financial risk taking, as well as the number of children, a proxy for bequest 
motives. Panel B reports results for alternative proxies for savings behavior. See Appendix Table A1 for a 
definition of Savings Rate 2 and 3. Panel C reports results for twins that have little contact with one another 
(first quintile), for those that have intermediate contact (second, third, and fourth quintiles) and for those that 
have frequent contact (fifth quintile). In each case, we report the variance fraction of the combined error term 
explained by each random effect (A – for the additive genetic effects, C – for shared environmental effects, E 
– for the individual-specific random effect) as well as the corresponding standard errors. When the non-
negativity constraint for a variance parameter is binding, we report a zero.  We do not report the coefficient 
estimates for Male, Age, and Age-squared. N provides the number of observations used in each estimation.  Table 6
Gene x Environment Interactions
Panel A: Family Socioeconomic Status (SES) in Childhood and Early Adolescence
Model N
Low-SES Family  2,223
High-SES Family  3,678
Panel B: Wealth
Model N
Low Net Worth 3,526
Intermediate Net Worth 10,578
High Net Worth 3,526
Panel C: Population Density
Model N
Population Density: Low  3,545
Population Density: Middle 10,587































Table 6 reports results from maximum likelihood estimation of linear random effects models. The Savings Rate is 
modeled as a linear function of Male, Age, Age-squared as well as up to three random effects representing 
additive genetic effects (A), shared environmental effects (C), as well as an individual-specific error (E). In Panel 
A, we report results for the subset of 5,901 twins for whose parents we have educational information. Panel B 
reports results for twins that have relatively low net worth (first quintile), for those with intermediate net worth 
(second, third, and fourth quintiles) and for those that have high net worth (fifth quintile). Panel C reports results 
for twins that live in sparsely populated municipalities (first quintile), in municipalities with intermediate population 
density (second, third, and fourth quintile), and in municipalities with high population density (fifth quintile). In each 
case, we report the variance fraction of the combined error term explained by each random effect (A – for the 
additive genetic effects, C – for shared environmental effects, E – for the individual-specific random effect) as well 
as the corresponding standard errors. When the non-negativity constraint for a variance parameter is binding, we 
report a zero.  We do not report the coefficient estimates for Male, Age, and Age-squared. N provides the number 
of observations used in each estimation.  Table 7
Net-Worth at Retirement Age
Model N





Table 7 reports results from maximum likelihood estimation of linear random effects models. Net-Worth is modeled as 
a linear function of Male, Age, Age-squared as well as up to three random effects representing additive genetic effects
(A), shared environmental effects (C), as well as an individual-specific error (E). We report the variance fraction of the 
combined error term explained by each random effect (A – for the additive genetic effects, C – for shared 
environmental effects, E – for the individual-specific random effect) as well as the corresponding standard errors. 
When the non-negativity constraint for a variance parameter is binding, we report a zero.  We do not report the 
coefficient estimates for Male, Age, and Age-squared. N provides the number of observations.  Appendix Table A1
Definition of all Variables
Variable Description
Types of Twins
Identical Twins Twins that are genetically identical, also called monozygotic twins. Zygosity is determined by the 
Swedish Twin Registry based on questions about intrapair similarities in childhood.
Non-identical Twins Twins that share on average 50% of their genes, also called dizygotic or fraternal twins. Non-
identical twins can be of the same sex or of opposite sex. Zygosity is determined by the Swedish 
Twin Registry based on questions about intrapair similarities in childhood.
Measures of Savings Behavior
Savings Rate Savings Rate is calculated as the change in net worth between the end of 2002 and the end of 
2006, less the change in home value, divided by the total disposable income for 2003 to 2006. 
The top and bottom 1% of the distribution have been dropped. Savings Rate is the main empirical 
proxy for an individual's savings behavior.
Savings Rate 2 Savings Rate 2 is calculated as the change in net worth between the end of 2002 and the end of 
2006 divided by the sum of total disposable income for 2003 to 2006 and the change in home 
value between 2002 and 2006.  The top and bottom 1% of the distribution have been dropped. 
Savings Rate 2 is an alternative empirical proxy for an individual's savings behavior. It is available 
for 17,465 out of 17,630 twins in our data set.
Savings Rate 3 Savings Rate 3 is calculated as the change in net worth between the end of 2002 and the end of 
2006 divided by the total disposable income for 2003 to 2006.  The top and bottom 1% of the 
distribution have been dropped. Savings Rate 3 is an alternative empirical proxy for an individual's 
savings behavior. It is available for 17,516 out of 17,630 twins in our data set.
Sociodemographic Characteristics
Male An indicator variable that equals one if an individual is male and zero otherwise. Gender is 
obtained from the Statistics Sweden.
Age An individual's age on Dec. 31, 2006 as reported by the Statistics Sweden.
Married An indicator variable that equals one if an individual is married in all years between 2003 and 
2006 and zero otherwise. It is obtained from the Statistics Sweden.
Divorced An indicator variable that equals one if an individual is divoverced in all years between 2003 and 
2006 and zero otherwise. It is obtained from the Statistics Sweden.
Widowed An indicator variable that equals one if an individual is widowed in all years between 2003 and 
2006 and zero otherwise. It is obtained from the Statistics Sweden.
High School Degree An indicator variable that equals one if an individual has at most completed high school, zero 
otherwise. Educational information is obtained from Statistics Sweden.
College Degree An indicator variable that equals one if an individual has at least completed high school and at 
most two years of university, zero otherwise. Educational information is obtained from Statistics 
Sweden.
Graduate Degree An indicator variable that equals one if an individual has completed at least two years of 
university, zero otherwise. Educational information is obtained from Statistics Sweden.
Homeowner An indicator variable that equals one if the market value of owner occupied real estate is positive 
and zero otherwise. Market values are obtained from Statistics Sweden.
Disposable Income The average Disposable Income (in nominal terms) of the individual for the period 2003 to 2006, 
as defined by Statistics Sweden, that is the sum of income from labor, business, and investment, 
plus received transfers, less taxes and alimony payments. When reported in United States Dollars 
(USD), Swedish Krona (SEK) amounts have been converted at SEK/USD 7.1588, the average 
end of year exchange rate for 2003 to 2006. The data are obtained from Statistics Sweden.
Net Worth The average difference between the market value of an individual's assets and her liabilities, 
calculated by Statistics Sweden at the end of each year between 2003 and 2006. When reported 
in United States Dollars (USD), Swedish Krona (SEK) amounts have been converted at SEK/USD 
7.1588, the average end of year exchange rate for 2003 to 2006. The data are obtained from 
Statistics Sweden.
Home Value The value of an individual's owner occupied home as reported by Statistics Sweden at the end of 
2006. When reported in United States Dollars (USD), Swedish Krona (SEK) amounts have been 
converted at SEK/USD 6.8453, the end of year exchange rate in 2006. Home Value is missing for 
non homeowners. The data are obtained from Statistics Sweden.
Change in Net Worth The change in an individual's net worth between the end of 2002 and the end of 2006.  When 
reported in United States Dollars (USD), Swedish Krona (SEK) amounts have been converted at 
SEK/USD 7.1588, the average end of year exchange rate for 2003 to 2006. The data are 
obtained from Statistics Sweden.
Change in Home Value The change in the value of the owner occupied house between the end of 2002 and the end of 
2006.  When reported in United States Dollars (USD), Swedish Krona (SEK) amounts have been 
converted at SEK/USD 7.1588, the average end of year exchange rate for 2003 to 2006. Change 
in Home Value is zero for non homeowners. The data are obtained from Statistics Sweden.
Other
Contacts per Year The number of contacts per year between twins. The number is calculated as the average of the 
numbers reported by both twins. If only one twin provides a number, this number is used. The 
number is available for 16,252 of the 17,630 twins in our data set.The data are obtained from the 
Swedish Twin Registry.
Population Density Number of individuals per square kilometer. The data are available for all twins at the municipality 
level (there are 289 municipalities in our data set). The data are obtained from Statistics Sweden.Figure 1
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